Thursday, December 15, 2016
د افغانستان د پخواني ولسمشر برهان الدین رباني لور فاطمه رباني په دې وروستیو کې د بازار په نوم يوې مجلې سره مرکه کړې او په هغه کې يې عکسونه هم خپاره شوي چې د يوه افغان ډيزاينر له خوا طرح شوي جامې يې پکي اغوستي دي.
|WHAT A SHAME,HER FATHER URGED AFGHAN WOMEN TO WEAR BURQA AND STAY AWAY FROM THE EDCATION.|
پر ټولنيزو رسنیو افغانانو د فاطمه رباني د دې مرکې په عکس العمل کې انتقادونه وکړل.
ځيني افغانان ادعا کوي چې د يوه جهادي مشر لور چې د پلار د واکمنۍ پر وخت يې ښځو د کار اجازه نه درلوده، اوس د مُدل په حيث کار کوي.
په دې اړه ملالۍ بشير له فاطمه رباني سره مرکه کړې ده او په سر کې يې ځيني پوښتلي چې د هغې پروژې په اړه معلومات راکړي چې دا يې برخه وه او په اړه يې د خلکو عکس العملونه راوپارېدل
A 18-year-old Pakistani student has succumbed to his wounds received in the deadly 2014 militant attack on the Army Public School here, three days before the country marks the second anniversary of the massacre that claimed over 150 lives.
Irshad Hussain was being treated at a hospital in Rawalpindi for the bullet wounds he received in the attack. He had been shot in neck and back, leading to critical injuries, The Nation reported.
Huss ain was suffering from mental trauma caused by the horrific attack, according to family.
On Decemebr 16, 2014, over 150 people, nearly all of them school children, were massacred when heavily armed Taliban suicide bombers stormed a Pakistan army-run school here, firing indiscriminately, leaving another 130 injured.
The deadly attack shocked the entire nation, prompting the government to launch a national action plan (NAP) to root out the scourge of terrorism and extremism once and for all.
The country also decided to put an end to capital punishment, sending scores of convicts to gallows.
The government and opposition parties agreed to set up military courts for trial of hardcore terrorists to expedite campaign against foreign and local militants.
Six months before the APS attack, Pakistan had launched ‘Operation Zarb-e-Azb’ in North Waziristan, killing hundreds of militants in aerial strikes and a major ground offensive.
The North Waziristan operation was launched after militants targeted Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport in a speculator attack that saw over two dozen people killed in June 2014.
By David Brewster
China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is carving out new pathways across the Eurasian continent, signifying Beijing’s ambitions to remake the world around it. This project, if implemented, will fundamentally change China’s role and relationships in South Asia, perhaps in some ways that are not intended.
In the Indian Ocean region, OBOR has two aspects. One is the Maritime Silk Road, a series of linked port projects aimed at facilitating trade and new production chains linked with China by sea. The other is a series of planned north–south pathways from China to the Indian Ocean, including the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor. These projects come with huge price tags and would involve the construction of roads, railways, pipelines and other major infrastructure in corridors stretching for hundreds and even thousands of kilometres.
Beijing has many motivations for these ambitious undertakings. Most immediately, they put to work Chinese infrastructure companies that are facing a tough domestic market. They also promise the development of new regional production chains with China at the centre. These corridors could also drive development in poor and politically unstable parts of Pakistan and Myanmar, potentially helping to stabilise those troubled countries. This reflects Beijing’s views on the transformative impact of state-driven economic development. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reportedly characterised the Chinese projects in Pakistan as a means to ‘wean the populace from fundamentalism’.
But these new overland pathways also have the potential to fundamentally alter China’s role in South Asia and the entire strategic make-up of the region. Geopolitically, South Asia has long functioned more or less as an island rather than as part of a bigger continent. Any overland connections that South Asia has with the rest of the continent are, at best, tenuous and excepting a tiny proportion of trade that is carried overland to and from Eurasia, essentially all of South Asia’s connections with the rest of the world are by sea or air.
These geographic constraints have had considerable political, economic and strategic consequences for the region. One is in underpinning India’s role as South Asia’s predominant power. The relative lack of landward connections into the Eurasian continent also amplifies the importance of control over the maritime trade routes across the northern Indian Ocean.
Geography has also caused Eurasian states, such as China, to have very limited contact with their South Asian neighbours. Sitting on the other side of the Himalayas, China may as well have been on the other side of the world. While it has been a strategic player in South Asia for some time, it has been from far away. China’s virtual remoteness allowed it to keep its hands clean of domestic political and security problems, even while it provided substantial military and diplomatic support to the Pakistani government. This has helped China to project itself as a benevolent partner that does not ‘meddle’ in internal affairs.
But China’s role in the region may be about to fundamentally change. The CPEC will involve many thousands of Chinese engineers and workers building billions of dollars of infrastructure over thousands of kilometres of territory on a scale far exceeding any previous Chinese investments in Pakistan. While the final route is yet to be determined, the corridor will likely traverse the territories of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan and Balochistan. These are territories with long-running insurgencies or long histories of violent resistance to meddling foreigners.
Pakistan has sought to address CPEC security risks by forming a special army corps of 12,000 personnel devoted to protecting the project. But, at least until recently, China has been surprisingly sanguine about these risks and its ability to rely on the Pakistan Army.
If separatists or fundamentalist insurgents see benefit in attacking Chinese nationals and assets, then the Pakistan Army may be in for a difficult time. There are already past reports of Chinese security forces providing protection to Chinese workers in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and it is not difficult to contemplate a growing Chinese security element in other Pakistani territories if the Pakistan Army is unable to cope by itself. CPEC also has the potential to enmesh China much more closely in Pakistan for reasons beyond just physical security, making it a key player in the country’s internal political and security affairs.
India is still formulating its views about CPEC, but has already expressed outright opposition to some aspects. India’s Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar called OBOR a ‘national initiative devised with national interest’, stating that it was ‘not incumbent on others to buy it’. Some in Delhi argue that anything that helps Pakistan’s economic development and potentially stabilises the country would be a good thing for India. But one aspect that infuriates Delhi is China’s plans to build infrastructure in Kashmir and Gilgit, territories claimed by India. India has repeatedly presented its strong objections to China without any apparent response.
We are already seeing some indications of a new geopolitical dynamic over CPEC. There is Beijing pushing for the Pakistan Army to be given a leading role—above that of any civilian authorities—in CPEC. Then there is the prospect of China’s much closer involvement in Pakistan’s domestic political affairs, both in Islamabad and regionally. And there is India, a major regional power looking for ways to threaten China’s plans in Pakistan.
In August 2016, in a national Independence Day speech, Indian Prime Minister Modi sent a clear message that India may begin to publicly support Balochistan’s separatist insurgents. This represents a big shift for India and was directed almost as much at Beijing as at Islamabad. A senior and well-connected Chinese scholar responded that China will have ‘to get involved’ if India seeks to disrupt the CPEC. On 21 September, in the wake of the deterioration in Indo–Pakistan relations over Kashmir, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang publicly warned his civilian Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, that he ‘hoped’ Pakistan can continue to provide safety protection to the program construction and Chinese personnel in Pakistan. These may well be the opening moves to a whole new strategic dynamic in South Asia driven by China’s great OBOR ambitions.
Senator Farhatullah Babar has said that although the recently passed Anti honour killing was an important legislation as it closed the door of acquittal through the law there still were some issues that needed to be addressed. He was addressing students at the Quaid-e Azam University Thursday morning on the current legislation and way forward. The positive side is that the new legislation ensures that even if the entire family of the victim pardoned the murderer will still face a mandatory 25 years jail term without any remission. But the downside is how to establish a murder as ‘honour’ killing, he said. If the perpetrator claimed that the murder was for other reasons it will make the crime compoundable and killer will be promptly pardoned under the Qisas law. A heavy burden has been placed on the shoulders of investigators, prosecutors and the judge to disprove the murderer and hold it as a case of ‘honour killing’.
He said that the underlying principle in the concept of Qisas is to save a human life under death sentence and not to condone the crime itself.
So even if the compoundable provision of Qisas were to be applied it should be applicable only after the trial has commenced, the charges framed and proved in a court of law and the murderer has been awarded capital punishment and not before the completion of this cycle. What has been happening is that instead of following the full procedure a compromise is made and the heirs of the victim pardon the murderer in a scenario in which both the victim and the murderer are represented by the same person. No wonder that murderers have literally walked out of the lock ups within weeks, not only without conviction but even without any trial, he said.
He said that it is time the legislature and political parties gave a serious thought to the recommendations made last year by the National Commission on the Status of Women (NCS) proposing several amendments to the Qisas and Diyat law. He said that according to an estimate over 2770 women were killed during the five year period from 2008, making an average of over 500 murders in a year in addition to un-reported cases as well as the number of men also killed alongside women in the name of honour. He said that despite closing the door of acquittal through the law it will take quite some time to close the door through the society as well. In an environment in which bodies like the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) publicly declare that men may beat their wives, refuse to accept DNA tests in rape cases and reject legislation against child marriages and forced conversions the door through the society to acquit honor killers will not be completely shut, he said.
Shutting this door requires that we revisit the role and purpose of the ideology Council as well as strengthen the Commission on Status of Women. Traditionally resistance to make honour crime a non-compoundable offence has been spearheaded by the religious lobby on grounds of ideology but it is a self-serving argument, he said. The original anti honour murder bill that made honour murders totally non compoundable was approved unanimously across the party divide by the Senate Committee on interior that was headed by a JUI F Senator.
Subsequently it was also passed in the plenary session of Senate unanimously. JUI-F members including its stalwart the Deputy Chairman Senate all voted for it. But objections were raised by them at the time when the Bil came up before the joint session, he said. Furthermore, the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance and the Anti-Terror laws also do not allow compounding the crime of murder he said. The rejection of the original anti honour killing bill therefore had nothing to do with ideology. Perhaps the opposition to it is motivated by pathological anti-woman bias of the ideology lobby, he said.