The army, and previous governments, must take much of the responsibility for the violence the country has suffered in recent years. The growth of the TTP is a direct consequence of neurotic fear of encirclement by India which is widespread in Pakistan’s ruling class and has led to the disastrous policy of exploiting and encouraging jihadist groups in Kashmir—territory disputed by India and Pakistan—and in Afghanistan. The TTP operates from North Waziristan, one of the ungoverned tribal areas that border Afghanistan, where the Haqqani network holes up. This highly effective Afghan criminal-terrorist gang, responsible for some of worst violence in Afghanistan, is an ally of Pakistan’s intelligence service and was seen for many years by the army as a key strategic asset to be cosseted rather than disrupted.
A further inhibition for the army’s top brass has been the growing Islamist radicalisation within the once-secular and Westernised institution itself, a reflection of both changes in Pakistani society and a policy of recruiting poor boys from the inner cities. And as the TTP grew in strength, the security forces held off taking it on for fear of reprisals.
No going back
After Nawaz Sharif became prime minister in June 2013 and Raheel Sharif (they are not related) took over as chief of army staff a year ago this disastrous policy began to change. Both men came to the conclusion that jihadist terrorism poses a greater threat to their country than India does. Since June 2014 the army has been carrying out an offensive against the militants. Operation Zarb-e-Azb is aimed at destroying their sanctuaries in North Waziristan. The army claims that around 1,000 militants have been killed with few civilian casualties. The TTP says that women and children have borne the brunt of the air strikes and the army should “feel the pain” of retaliation in kind—hence the attack on the school.
Now that battle against the terrorists has been joined, the army cannot retreat; and there are some other modestly encouraging signs from other fronts. Since the election of Ashraf Ghani as president of Afghanistan in September 2014, relations between the two countries have improved dramatically. Mr Ghani has offered a hand of friendship to Nawaz Sharif by agreeing to a range of confidence-building measures that include sending Afghan army officers to Pakistan for military training and reaching a deal on managing the border. Mr Ghani also appears to have given permission to the Americans to carry out drone strikes against TTP havens in eastern Afghanistan, something his predecessor refused. In return, Pakistan’s army seems to have given up protecting the Haqqanis, at least for now.
That is progress, but more is needed. Reining in other terrorist groups that the state has cultivated will ultimately require moves towards a rapprochement with India over Kashmir. For that to happen India’s government will also have to show vision. Pakistan’s feuding politicians and its potentially rebellious army need to find something that has eluded them in the past: common cause in the national interest.
Defeating the terrorists will take a long time. But the slaughter at the Army Public School and Degree College in Peshawar may just persuade Pakistan’s politicians and soldiers to unite in this necessary fight.